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INTRODUCTION

This Reply Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant
(hereinafter "Appellant") is intended to reply to new matters
raised in the Defendants-Respondents' (hereinafter
"Respondents'") Brief.

This Reply Brief is therefore not an

exhaustive analysis of the Appellant's arguments on appeal; but
is to be read together with the Appellant's Briefs on file
herein.

Please note that this Reply Brief addresses all four

cases on appeal herein (Qgden, Lind, Laygo and Springer), whereas
there are two Appellant Briefs on file herein, one for Qgden and
Lind prepared by Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General and
one for Laygo and Springer prepared by Alan S. Bachman, Assistant
Attorney General.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant (UDOT) relies upon its statement of facts as
stated in the Appellant's Briefs on file herein.

Respondents

(Landowners) seem to list all components of the record of this
case for almost half the length of their 69 page "Brief".

To

the extent Respondents' statement of facts conflict with those of
the Appellant, the Appellant contends that the Respondents
recitation of facts are in error.

Some of those specific errors

need further explanation as provided hereinbelow.
1.

Appellant objects to the inclusion in Respondents'

Brief at pages 6 and 36-38 of any matters pertaining to the

Partington trial which the trial court ruled inadmissible.
Though Respondents claimed to have proffered the evidence to
protect their record on appeal, Respondents failed to crossappeal in order to raise their contention that such evidence
should have been considered by the trial court.

Therefore, it is

impermissible for Respondents to have that inadmissible evidence
in their Brief or to be considered by this Court.
2.

Contrary to the Respondents' assertion on P. 7 of

their Brief, the reference by Appellant to the lack of the
Respondents raising the issue of the valuation date in their
answer, in the immediate occupancy process, or even in the
pretrial conferences, is of course, relevant to the issue of
whether Respondents timely raised this issue.
3.

In regard to the particular subject properties, the

Appellant's Briefs describe the portions of the record and
transcript which rebut many of the statement made by Respondents
in their statement of facts.

For instance Exhibit "I" and 48 in

the record demonstrate that the Ogden property was in excess of a
45% grade.

The record referred to in Appellant's Briefs refers

to the lack of ripeness of the properties for urban development
and the lack of "follow-through" of the Laygo RespondentDefendants to develop their property; all of which need not be
repeated here in this Reply Brief.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS DID NOT INTRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE UNDER THE FRIBERG CASE FOR
CHANGING THE VALUATION DATE.
Despite all the discussion by the Respondents of State
Com'n v, Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), Respondents failed to
properly address the key test provided in that case for changing
the valuation date.

The Friberg decision creates a rebuttable

presumption that the valuation date is the date of service of
process and, in essence, places the burden of proof on the
proponent of a changed valuation date.

It further states that

"to rebut that presumption, the unfairness of valuing property as
of that date must be evident and the difference in value must not
be insignificant. " Friberg, supra, at 831-832 (emphasis added).
What is the significant change in value that
Respondents wish to assert?
the trial court find?

What significant change in value did

What was the highest and best use of the

subject properties in 1977 as required by Utah law in order to
determine valuation?

State Road Commission v. Wood# 22 U.2d 317,

452 P.2d 872 (1969).

Was speculative assembling of the

properties needed to have an urban use of the properties?

Did

comparable land prices change significantly from 1977 to 1987?
If so, what was that change?

Where are these questions answered

-3-

in Respondents' Brief?

The Respondents have failed to show any

significant change in value of the subject properties from the
1987 valuation date to 1977, This is the first step under
Friberg, supra.

Respondents do argue that changes in the

development market existed between 1977 and 1987. However,
condemnation valuation is concerned with just compensation and
the fair market value of the property between a willing buyer and
willing seller(1961).

State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 366 P.2d 76

If the landowners can receive a fairly similar price for

their property in 1977 and 1987, regardless of the development
costs differential to the purchaser, then their has not been a
substantial change in value that would cause a change in the
valuation date under Friberg, supra.

In other words, since the

appraisal evidence, as introduced by the State before the trial
court, indicates that the 1977 and 1987 fair market values of the
subject properties are not significantly different, then the
evidence relied upon by Respondents that it costs more to develop
in 1987 is inconsequential.

The only relevant consequence is if

willing seller-willing buyer transactions from 1977 to 1987
indicate that the fair market value of the subject properties has
significantly declined from 1977 to 1987.
Therefore, in the absence of any showing of a
significant change in value (fair market value) between 1977 to
1987, the trial court had no basis for changing the valuation
-4-

date from the statutory service of summons date.
Even if Respondents were to meet the initial test of
Friberg , supraf by showing a significant change ,J n value from
1977 to 1987, Respondents have failed to she >w that their
proper ties were j : i pe for t he type of urban development in 19 77
that they wish to espouse.

Respondents have failed to show that

utilities were reasonably available to the properties in 19 7 7;
have failed to sh:w that the landow ners pursued development of
their properties; and have failed to show that the City had any
adopted law or regulation (which would have been required) which
precluded development ot the properties because uf a potential
freeway.

(These matters and the appropriate parts of the Record

are discussed In the Appellant Briefs).

Mr. Mclff, before the

trial court, testified that certain of the properties could be
assembled together to become developable.

That testimony was

a 11 owed by the t r I a 1 court ii I error a s i 1: I s s pecu 1 a11 ve
evidence, as discussed in the Appellant Bri efs,
-' —-•" ' ~ "•

address

this

issue

3s/ ? ~ ; • r'

or : ^

-^

„:i:t-

.

State v. Jacobs,

Respondents did not even

*. . — ; .-.;.-:-

i thai .: Br i € ?f.

Respondents cite cases from other jurisdictions in an •
effort to bolster support for their argument that the valuation
date should be changed.

None of these cases help the

Respondents.

-5-

Respondents rely on Bd. of Cty. Com'rs v. Delaney, Col.
App., 592 P.2d 1338 (1978).

That case, however, discussed an

irrigation ditch that was replaced and an allowance of repair
evidence after the date of "take". The Colorado Court of Appeals
noted that though the cost of repairs was compensable "... it is
unfair to restrict these costs to any period of time before the
condemnee received title to the easement."
1340.

Delaney, supra at

This case is not relevant to the current fact situation

and does nothing to show that Respondents should have a 1977
valuation date.
Respondents then cite State v. Hollis, 179 P.2d 750
(Ariz. 1963).

Hollis requires that conditions caused by a

condemnation not be used to reduce value.

The Arizona Supreme

Court in Hollis determined that a lease which would have
continued in effect if not for the highway project, could still
be considered to determine value. UDOT would agree with this
decision and acknowledges that with the use of the 1987 valuation
date, any specific conditions caused by the condemnation
activities of UDOT can not be used to lower the value of the
Respondents' properties.

No change in the valuation date is

needed to allow into evidence, leases or other transactions that
would have existed but for the condemnation.
Respondents cite Udovich v. Arizona Board of Regents,

-6-

9 Ari z. App. 400, 453 P.2d 229 (1969),
the Appellants herein.

That case actual ly aids

Uvodich involves a counterclaim (which

Respondents here failed to fi le) i i i order t : cc: ntend a prev i ous
taking occurred.

Like the Hollis case, the Court held that the

landowner was still free to show any depreciation in value Que to
the condemnation.
Respondents cite City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 748 P. 2d
7 (Nev. 1987)

That case states 1:1 lat :•

Substantial evidence was presented to establish that
the 1972 Sparks actions with regard to the tentative
subdivision plan made it clear that future development
on such parcels would not be permitted.
Although the mere planning of a project is generally
insufficient to constitute a taking, when
precondemnation activities of the government become
unreasonable or oppressive in such a manner that
those activities adversely affect the market value of
the property, then the property owner is entitled
to compensation. [City of Sparks, at 8]
11 :i t he i s u b j e c t ca. es , t he properti es d :i d not have
d e v e l o p m e n t plans that w e r e denied by UDOT.

'•

In fact, no such

d e v e l o p m e n t s w e r e presented, and if they w e r e , it w o u l d have been
the loca 1 goveri iment that wou 3 d ha ve revi ew ed tl le plai is , i :i : t:
UDOT.

In t h e subject cases as indicated in t h e A p p e l l a n t ' s

B r i e f s , t h e properties w e r e not ripe for development in 1977 or
the p r o p e r t y owners did not actively pursue d e v e l o p m e n t

As

d i s c u s s e d on Page 24 of the Laygo/Springer A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief, i n

the only property that was ripe for development in 1977, Laygo,
the property owners did not even develop the portion of their
property that was unaffected by the proposed freeway and also did
not coordinate with UDOT, when such help was offered, to
delineate the area of their property that UDOT would not be
interested in, even if funding were later to be available.
In any event, if the property owners would have so developed in
1977, U.C.A. §78-34-4 (1987) would have required UDOT to pay for
such improvements to the subject property made before the service
of summons.
Respondents cite Com., Dept. of Transp. v. DiFurio, 555
A.2d 1379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).

However, that case involves a

condemnor actually sending a condemnation notice letter to the
landowner as well as visits with the landowner's employees prior
to formally filing the condemnation action.
unreasonable intrusion by the government.

This is an

In the current

situation, UDOT did nothing more than publicize the potential
route in order that it could receive the proper public attention
in order to assure that it is desired and located properly.

It

is not a disputed fact in this case that after funding was
obtained, UDOT then pursued any notices of intent to condemn and
the requisite condemnation actions.
Appellant's Briefs).
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(Statement of Facts,

Respondents cite Lange v. State of Washington, 86 Wash,
I cfii:i

r

i4n F.Td ?*?

i l^i I

MriWMvr-r, 1 I J a t: case requ I i : es I ::he

State to manifest "its unequivocal intent to appropriate" the
subject property.

The Lange property owners instituted an

j nverse condem nati on i n iini n ttempt" 111 hav € • thei i" o n\ tPinf I on
precondemnation blight aired before the cour:.

Il

The court found,

however f that:
there was no evidence of interim .nc
on the part of the State so as to c^
the property at a depreciated value,
fLange, at 284]

un

In the current case, the State of Utah had not
manifested its unequivocal intent to appropriate the subject
j: r oper ti es as I t: cou Id i IC t e i ei l 1 lad doi le s :: • 1 egaJ 1 y wi tl lout
funding.

In fact, under Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 56 7 P.2d

182 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , UDOT could not have manifested an unequivocal
...;.:,en: until 1 98:5, when funding was obtained for the subject
project , This funding is necessary for UDOT to announce "its
commitment to the project" wii i cl: I c : i ;:i ] d i: ecgi i ii re 1:1 n a n ise :: i: c
valuation date at that time.

[See County of Clark v. Alper, 685

P. 2d 943, 948 (Nev. 1984) which was relied upon i n City of

:i n good faith and;, there is no evidence that UDOT did anything to
delay the condemnation process in order L U ^ake advantage of

-9-

declining property values.

In fact, in 1977, UDOT would have had

every reason to believe that property values would have increased
and that it was in UDOT's interest to commence condcsmnation
proceedings immediately, but for that fact that it would have
been premature as funding was not available.
POINT II.
UTAH LAW CLEARLY ONLY ALLOWS PAYMENT
OF INTEREST FROM DATE OF OCCUPANCY
OR ENTRY ON PROPERTY.
Respondents are in error when they indicate that U.C.A.
§78-34-9 has not been construed since Friberg, supra.

The

Utah Court of Appeals in Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City
v. Daskalas, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 70, (Ct. App. 10/11/89), a 1989
decision, found that the RDA did not occupy the Owners' property
and that:
under section 78-34-9, where there is no entry
or occupation of the property by the condemning
agency, there is no entitlement to interest.
The Daskalas case, being a 1989 case, is consistent with the
following cases cited in Appellant's Briefs: City of So. Ogden
v. Fujiki, 621 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1980), which held that the City
did not occupy the property and therefore interest commenced from
the date the final judgment was entered;

State v. Peek, 1 Utah

2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), wherein even the issuance of a
service of summons which interfered with the use of the property

-10-

did not constit"t- possessicr h- t v ~ F4--?4-^ »nd t^« »war ziiriu
interest would

~lv * .- * ,« *„;>- i^*-e r - act^a.

condemnor;

State . . neitxiyon

:.

^session t/ r v

(1965), whereir the deferral cf a subdivisU
< onsf i f u f f* - :'

ent occupation ui tne -rc r ^r*v to commence

interest.
A p p e l l a n t s respectfully request your court t. uphold
I he IOIILJ line nt casRv-

in Utah,

The Friberj deeinioi

indicates that the prior cases concerning this interest
should be overturned.

, riy
issue

The Utah Court c: Appea" ? indicates

c o n c u r r e n c e or. *,., £ ~z.? ~ J

:. :..

r .« _ cs&cx^&^

««.'isi u11,.

:- supporting their argument zz I\* *e interest c o m m e n c e
'--?:-—--'r.ir

--

"

• - >- •'--•- i»

*:'-: tr.cit w a ? : d e f a c t c

„-.- -r held

hostage"

i&k.. ,r >.i, 1977. A t t h e

s a m e t i m e , R e s p o n d e n t s attempt ~ c irgue t.ha' thev had n o c l a i m
tl iat tl: i ey coul ::i 1 la e • pre -sented agai nst 1: 1 le Sta te HI 1 1 1 11 | i u I :i i I
time.

(This is discussed further, infra.)

Of course, it the

land w a s held hostage or i f their w a s a defacto taking in 1 y /" 7",
t h e n Respondei I t s c on 3 « I 1 la ' e presei ited ai I i i iv erse condemns* 1 i c in
claim, at that point in ti me.

H o w e v e r , Respondents did not d o s o ,

and f :)i: g< :) :>d reason,- si nee t h e land w a s n o t held hostage a n a
t h e r e w a s n o taking in 1 9 7 7 .
A s discussed in the A p p e l l a n t ' s Briefs, the e v i d e n c e i n

- 11-

the record indicated that the land was not held hostage in 1977.
Respondents conveniently fail to address a case raised on Page 25
of the Laygo/Springer Appellant Brief: Sproul Homes of Nevada v.
State Ex. Rel. Dept. of Highways and County of Clarkf 611 P.2d
620 (Nev. 1980).

Though Respondents cite the City of Sparksf

supra, Nevada case, that case is not on point since it involved
the condemnor actually denying development on the owners land.
It is the Sproul Homes case that is on point.

Sproul Homes

indicates that:
Beyond the claimed entry for the purpose
of surveying and appraising, there is no
allegation of a physical invasion of its
land. Nor is there any showing of finality
regarding the state's proposed project.
Indeed there is no allegation that the
appellants's property will definitely be
acquired for highway purposes. Sproul Homes, at 622
(emphasis added).
The Nevada Supreme Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the
inverse condemnation complaint.

The current situation is similar

to Sproul Homes and not City of Sparks.

In the current

situation, UDOT had no final plans in 1977 to acquire the subject
properties.

In fact, UDOT did not have funding approved until

December, 1985.

(Plaintiff-Appellant's Exhibit 65, Ogden R-64,

Lind R-54, Laygo R-48 and Springer R-46).

The cases at issue

herein are therefore similar to Sproul Homes, supra.
Since the Respondents' properties were not "held
hostage" by UDOT in 1977 and since UDOT did not occupy or enter
-12-

the properties at that time, the tri al court erred in ruling that
interest run from 1977.
POINT III
CONTESTING T H E CONDEMNOR'S VALUATION
DATE IS A DEFENSE UNDER U.C.A. §78-34-3
Respondents claim that t h e change in valuation d a t e
. r. -

-/ ^ "..-r- .

Friberg, s u p r a , however, *: \:

.J

defense

cie?r *r.e.* the proponent h a s t h e

burden -**' rr:;f * " change the valuation date.
obvious : cc~ ^

\. ^

Ui ider

It shou] d b e

. ; ,nc nas i;.e .burden of

proof a n d that burden of p r r : : \; placed en the Defendant, a s is
c

*

- :

-

*

.-•

^ i •'.- - ;-- * *

their response to the Complaint,

*

-

•

31 s e

Here the Defendants did not

raise i t in their response to any of the subject Complaints -nd,
i i i fac I: , in.iL even a I U R ! Line of the hearing on the ir.: *-nat-j
occupancy issue.
DU S

:

Not on ] y was th is defense not properly raised,

*' :ice JLL xt n ^^fense tc a taking heiinn .ri 1 1 ^ ] »-M i

w i t h d r a w i n g t h e fur. as -,t i uuuediate occupancy, waives the d e f e n s e
under "J . '' /

•*- "c*

:

Respondv^r. \

-J • ; a i p P a \mw 1111 11 j m 11 11') a rguniPii 1 ( i

encouraging the withdrawal ol Junda i i urn the Court.

T h e p u b ! ic

policy argument i: egard ing th i s issue i s i n favor of UDOT. T h e
piibl ic po] icy shou 3 • Ifce that :i f I:l: le c oi ldemi lee bel ieves that I he
valuation date i s in error, the condemnee should raise that i ssue
no

i a t e r than t h e determination hy uie court that the condemnor

has made a good faith appraisal of the value of the property,
submitted it to the court, and therefore entitled to occupancy.
If the valuation date is in error, discovering it early allows
the appraisers on both sides to properly appraise the properties
and hopefully settle the valuation dispute between the parties.
When the money is withdrawn from the court after the immediate
occupancy hearing, the condemnor should have the right to rely
upon U.C.A. §78-34-9 and be assured that the condemnee will not
later contend that the condemnor already "de facto possessed" the
property previously and its complaint and appraisal for purposes
of immediate occupancy are based on an improper taking date.
Certainly, when a condemnor's complaint alleges the need to take
property and alleges a certain value, the condemnee's merely
contesting the value does not inform the condemnor that a claim
exists for a previous "de facto" taking.
U.R.C.P 12 (b) characterizes a "defense" as including
counterclaims.

Thus, even if a claim for inverse condemnation or

a previous "de facto" taking is a counterclaim to a complaint for
condemnation it nevertheless is a "defense" and it therefore is
waived if the funds are withdrawn upon immediate occupancy.
If the condemnee wished to draw upon the deposited funds, but did
not wish to waive the defense of a previous "defacto taking",
then the condemnee should have requested a stipulation from the
condemnor that the order of immediate occupancy include a
-14-

provision that this defense is not waived.
POINT IV
RESPONDENTS jy^ B A R R E D B Y S T A T U T E Q F
LIMITATIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT FROM RAISING 1977 "DEFACTO TAKING"
ALMOST TEN (] 0) YEARS LATER
Respondents do not contend that they raised their
contention of '""defacto taking" in 19?"", wi th I n the limits of *r.y
statute of ] im ita ti oi is oi t 1 la t t:l \ey fi J ed a clai m
G o v e r n m e n t a l Immunity A c t .

.•

:i

On Pages 62-63 of Respondents

they state that:
U D O T asserts that it could n o t h a v e instituted
condemnation proceedings in 1977 or 1978 since
the d e s i g n w a s not fully completed, nor were funds
m a d e a v a i l a b l e . T h e landowners accept that.
By the same t o k e n , the landowners could not have
instituted inverse condemnation a c t i o n s . An action
by either party would have been p r e m a t u r e , even t h o u g h
the corridor had been selected a n d the landowners'
properties held hostage. R e s p o n d e n t s Brief, Pages
62-63 (emphasis a d d e d ) .
The flaw in Respondents argument i s obvious.
c] a I in thei i: 1 and w a s hel d hostage i n 1 97 7 ID: : 1 978

They

Tl ley < :::.] a :i in

that U'DO'T and the landowners could i lot hav e instituted an;} action
j n 1 9 7 7 or 1978,

If the 1 and was held hostage in 1977 or 1978 an

actionable claim arose tl lei i

Tl le Respondents d :i d i I :::: !:: fi I! = • a

claim, then because there w a s not a "defacto taking" in 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 8 ,
If such a defacto taki ng d id occu r then, a notice of c] a i m u n d e r
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applicable statute of limitations should have been filed.
The Utah Supreme Court in Walton v. State Road
Commission, 558 P.2d 609 (Utah 1976), held that the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act applied to a case of inverse
condemnation alleging the taking of access. Respondemts analysis
of this case is simply incorrect.

Respondents claim that Walton:

does not involve the condemnation of private property.
... There was not a taking that would have required the
filing of eminent domain proceedings. An inverse
condemnation action would have been the only manner in
which the matter could have been brought before the
court. Respondents' Brief, Pages 65-66.
Obviously, if an inverse condemnation claim is actionable, then
the government should have been able to file a condemnation
claim up front.

In fact, an inverse condemnation claim is based

upon the government's failure to file a condemnation action when
it should have.

See State v. Hollis, supra, at 751, wherein the

Arizona Supreme Court states that:
The remainder of the Complaint alleges that
the State, without instituting condemnation
proceedings, appropriated the plaintiffs'
access right to their property and otherwise damaged
the property by the acts of its agent. The
complaint therefore states a cause of action
on the theory of inverse eminent domain.
Hollis, also necessarily concluded that a condemnation action can
be maintained for the taking of a property owner's access rights.
Respondents cite no law that prohibits the government from filing
a condemnation case for the taking of access. There is no reason
to believe that the Walton court would not have applied the same
-16-

analysis to a "defacto taking" such as the one Respondents
« i"MItend herein.
Respondents c11 ^ d N* j va 111 .'(i s t „ C i ty ol Sparks v .
Armstrong, 748 P.2d 7 (1987 i In an attempt to bolster their
ijHiuinent , H O W P V H T , Sparks does not discuss any governmental
immunity act and does not discuss Utah's statute \\i

JmuLdi i nit.

In reading the Sparks case, it is clear that; a governmental
immunity uct J,L in I iJ i snte r.ed

' "faMiitP

t 1 n in 11 at i r n defense

is discussed only after it is concluded that the case does not
f v. 1' r- ,-jn inverse condemnation claim without any explanation
that would aid as tc w n e m e r JL U appii i-di ie u
subject case here.

ilif i i MJ

I inn

Appellants respectfully request that your

i nujt M l low the log ir a

rpasonino ol the Utah r nurt in Walton

and not the uncertain reasoning of the Nevada court m

Sparks,

Respondents are a Is: incorrect about the
inapp] i cabili
immunity act applying

': * - ••• .

' *

.-r^-r-r/ai

:* Respondents ^. . . ^c. ; »+•

their land was ne^d "hostage" in 1977-78, the filing of a notice
o;t claim, would have served L\\H pui pose of ci lei Liny !ln;-> Stat:*-1 *f
Utah to the concerns of the landowners.
receiving the noti.rK \'f

The government, ni| in

I aim, could have instituted condemnation

proceedings ** £ certain conditions were met; aoturminea LIIGII 'tnoie
was

no actionable governmental intrusion; -.r ceased any

actionable intrusive activities.

Of course, the land was not

held "hostage" then and no notice of claim was filed.
Respondents then assert that Salt Lake v. Ramoselli#
567 P. 2d 182 (Utah 1977) aids their cause.

Ramoselli

indicates that the State can not condemn without funding approved
for the subject project.

In this case, as discussed previously,

funding was not approved antil December, 1985. What the Supreme
Court indicated in Ramoselli that UDOT can not do directly (file
a condemnation action prior to funding), it should not be able to
do indirectly (have a valuation date prior to the funding date).
If precondemnation activities of UDOT were (and they were not in
this case) holding the landowners' properties hostage prior to
UDOT having funding for the subject project in 1985, the
landowners could have successfully enjoined such actions as being
in violation of the Ramoselli case.
CONCLUSION
This is not intended to be a "findings" appeal, but
rather an interlocutory appeal requested for the purpose of
guiding the trial court in the application of law to the facts of
this case.

The law simply does not allow for the valuation date

to be changed from 1987 to 1977 based upon the evidence in the
record.

Respondents did not timely raise the valuation date

issue, both under the Governmental Immunity Act and any
applicable Utah statute of limitations.
-18-

Respondents

result,, waived the consideration of the defense claim of a
He; ,if* • 1: ak :i n j i n 19" "7 . The undisputed evidence indicates that
UDOT could not, and did not, unegu ivocal ly commi t to condemnation
of the subject properties until no earlier than December, 1985,
w t in e i 'i J* 1 J i i.d i ng w a s c! 1: 1: a i n ed.

T ii € • 1 a w i s a 1 s c c 1 e < i i f h a 1 s ii i t. ::: ' e UDOT

d i d n o t occupy or enter the subject properties in 197 ', that
i n t e r e s t can n o t commence back then.
E vei i 1 f Respondents did proper] y i: a 1 se the
date issue and could show that the properties were subjected to
u n reasonab] e i ntrusions i n 197 7 , Respondents have fa IJ ed to
present any credible evidence before the trial court that their
was a significant change in fair market value of the subject
proper ti es fr Dm 1 97 7 !:c 11! 9 8 7 :i i I o r • ier 1: ::> i i r ? ol ::e a chai ige :i n
valuation date under Friberg, supra.
Based upon the foregoi ng, the dates of valuati on i n
these subject ca ses shou 1 d be 11: ie servi ce :::: f summons a J i u in u=;i; e s t
should commence to run from, and after the dates the trial court
granted the applicable order of Immediate Occupancy,
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